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MICROSOFT-NOKIA MERGER CONTROL IN EAST
ASIA
By Luke Hung-Yu Chuang1and Shih-Wei Chao2
This article discusses the Microsoft–Nokia merger control case
to illustrate the varying approaches taken by the antitrust
authorities of China, South Korea, and Taiwan to mitigate the
anticompetitive effect potentially arising from Microsoft’s
acquisition of Nokia’s business unit. Unlike regulators in the
United States and the European Union, those in these Asian
countries took into consideration the possible harm to their
respective local industries from the acquisition and imposed
restrictions on the respective abilities of Microsoft and Nokia to
enforce their patents. The Microsoft–Nokia case demonstrates
that different antitrust regimes exist among Asian countries as
well as between regions of the globe.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2013, Microsoft announced it would acquire most
of Nokia’s Devices and Services Business (“DSB”), including the
design team, manufacturing capacity, marketing support, and
approximately 8,500 design patents. 3 Nokia also agreed to grant
Microsoft a 10-year nonexclusive license to its patent portfolio with the
option of making it permanent.4 At the time, Microsoft was the clear
leader in the world’s computer operating system market.5 Nokia had
also been a renowned mobile phone enterprise for the past two decades.
The purpose of Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia’s assets was to help
Microsoft officially enter the smartphone market, in which Nokia was
no longer competitive; the asset acquisition could help Microsoft bring
its own smartphone and mobile operating system to market. 6
Microsoft’s aspiration was to transform into a competitive smartphone
manufacturer by combining Nokia’s device design and manufacturing
capability with its own Windows Phone operating system.7
This vertical integration did not go to plan. 8 Despite the
significant boost from this acquisition and investment, Windows Phone
as a mobile operating system never became successful, and Microsoft
was unable to achieve a smartphone market share on par with that of
3
John “Jay” A. Jurata, Jr. & Inessa Mirkin Owens, A New Trade War:
Applying Domestic Antitrust Laws to Foreign Patents, 22 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1127, 1138–39 (2015).
4
Microsoft to Acquire Nokia’s Devices & Services Business, License Nokia’s
Patents and Mapping Services, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER (Sept. 3, 2013),
https://news.microsoft.com/2013/09/03/microsoft-to-acquire-nokias-devicesservices-business-license-nokias-patents-and-mapping-services/.
5
Ed Bott, Latest OS Share Data Shows Windows still Dominating in PCs,
ZDNET: THE ED BOTT REPORT (Apr. 1, 2013, 16:15),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/latest-os-share-data-shows-windows-stilldominating-in-pcs/.
6
See Microsoft, Nokia Devices and Services Business Aim to Remake Mobile
Market, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER (Apr. 25, 2014),
https://news.microsoft.com/2014/04/25/microsoft-nokia-devices-andservices-business-aim-to-remake-mobile-market-2 (“The completion of
Nokia Devices and Services business acquisition April 25 will enable
Microsoft to accelerate its share of smartphones and feature phones in
developed and emerging markets, and increases its role as a devices and
services company.”).
7
See James Vincent, Four Reasons Why Microsoft Had to Buy Nokia, THE
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 3, 2013, 15:19), http://www.independent.co.uk/lifestyle/gadgets-and-tech/features/four-reasons-why-microsoft-had-to-buynokia-8796638.html.
8
See Tom Warren, Microsoft Wasted at least $8 Billion on Its Failed Nokia
Experiment, THE VERGE (May 25, 2016, 5:20 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2016/5/25/11766540/microsoft-nokia-acquisitioncosts.
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Apple or Samsung. 9 Microsoft eventually sold Nokia’s DSB to
Foxconn and HMD Global.10
Microsoft’s acquisition was not a successful business strategy, but
the case is useful for the insights it offers to the comparative study of
merger control and antitrust law in general. When major multinational
corporations (“MNCs”) such as Microsoft and Nokia engage in
mergers and acquisitions (“M&As”), they are typically required to
notify the antitrust authorities of countries in which they operate and
refrain from completing the transaction until such authorities have
finished examining the potential effects on economies and markets they
represent.11 In some cases, the authorities intervene, but the extent to
which they do so varies considerably; intervention is much more likely
when the industry is a sensitive one, such as the development and
manufacture of smartphones or other high-tech products. 12 Factors
such as the country’s economic status, position in the global market,
and whether the country hosts prominent businesses determine the ease
with which regulatory approval is granted for a proposed M&A. 13
Approval of some deals may be contingent upon certain conditions; in
such cases, regulators may require the participating companies to agree
to certain limitations on their business operations (known as
“behavioral injunctions”) or agree to relinquish certain assets (known
as “structural remedies”). 14 These conditions are not meant to be
detrimental to merging companies but are rather aimed at preserving

9

See Roger Cheng, Microsoft may have just Killed Its Lumia Line. Good
Riddance, CNET (May 18, 2016, 8:34 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/microsoft-may-have-just-killed-its-lumia-linegood-riddance/.
10
Microsoft Selling Feature Phone Business to FIH Mobile Ltd. and HMD
Global, Oy, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER (May 18, 2016),
https://news.microsoft.com/2016/05/18/microsoft-selling-feature-phonebusiness-to-fih-mobile-ltd-and-hmd-global-oy/.
11
See Ilene Knable Gotts & Sarah E. Strasser, International Pre-Merger
Notification Requirements, in ALI-ABA’S PRACTICE CHECK MANUAL ON
ADVISING BUSINESS CLIENTS II: CHECKLISTS FORMS AND ADVICE FOR THE
PRACTICAL LAWYER 305, 305 (American Law Institute, 2000).
12
See W. Adam Hunt, Business Implications of Divergences in MultiJurisdictional Merger Review by International Competition Enforcement
Agencies, 28 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 147, 147–48 (2007); See also Keke
Feng, Patent-Related Mergers and Market Definition Under the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines: The Need to Consider Technology and
Innovation Markets, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 197, 197–202 (2011).
13
D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1055, 1103–04 (2010).
14
Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network
Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001).
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market competition and, in some cases, safeguarding the national
economy and industry.
Seeking clearance of the proposed acquisition, Microsoft and
Nokia filed merger notifications in numerous countries and regions.15
Both the United States (“US”) and European Union (“EU”) promptly
approved the merger without any conditions or restrictions.16 Russia,
India, Turkey, and Israel also gave such unconditional approval. 17
However, the case was rather different in East Asia, namely in China,
South Korea, and Taiwan, which are home to many of Microsoft and
Nokia’s allies and adversaries.18 The antitrust authorities in these East
Asian countries took significantly longer to investigate the proposed
acquisition and make their decisions, and the decisions were less
friendly to the companies.19
The US and EU decisions were respectively announced in late
November and early December 2013.20 In the US, merger control cases
15

See Tim Ferguson, Microsoft-Nokia Deal Clears European Regulatory
Hurdle, MOBILE WORLD LIVE (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.mobileworldlive.com/featured-content/top-three/microsoftnokia-deal-clear-final-regulatory-hurdle/.
16
Microsoft Nokia Merger gets SA Stamp of Approval, BUSINESSTECH, (Feb.
19, 2014),
https://businesstech.co.za/news/telecommunications/53370/microsoft-nokiamerger-gets-sa-stamp-of-approval/.
17
Id.; Foo Yun Chee, Microsoft to Win EU okay for $7.3 Billion Nokia Deal:
Sources, REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2013, 9:30 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-nokia-eu/microsoft-to-win-euokay-for-7-3-billion-nokia-deal-sources-idUSBRE9AL0V320131122.
18
Already the world’s largest smartphone market in 2013, China was home
to some of the biggest smartphone brands at the time, including Xiaomi,
Huawei and Lenovo. Even Apple, the most profitable smartphone company
in the world, has its phones assembled in China. South Korea is home to the
famous brands Samsung and LG and is well-known for its economic reliance
on the high-tech sector, particularly smartphone and component
manufacturing. Taiwan’s HTC was in its prime around 2013, leading the
Taiwanese smartphone industry. See Gartner Says Annual Smartphone Sales
Surpassed Sales of Feature Phones for the First Time in 2013, GARTNER
(Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/201402-13-gartner-says-annual-smartphone-sales-surpassed-sales-of-featurephones-for-the-first-time-in-2013. See also Research and Markets: The
Chinese Smartphone Industry: 2013 – 2014, BUSINESS WIRE (Apr. 25, 2014,
7:00 AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140425005246/en/ResearchMarkets-Chinese-Smartphone-Industry-2013--.
19
See Kim Yoo-chul, FTC Conditionally Approves Microsoft-Nokia Deal,
THE KOREA TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015, 19:32),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2015/02/133_173064.html.
20
U.S. Approves Microsoft Purchase of Nokia's Mobile Business, REUTERS
(Dec. 2, 2013, 12:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nokia-
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are decided by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and
Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 21 They approved via grant of early
termination but did not disclose much more than the decision itself.22
Thus, it is unclear to what extent they investigated the competitive
effect of the proposed acquisition. By contrast, the European
Commission (“EC”), the authority in charge of EU merger control,
released a much more thoroughly detailed decision.23 Its investigation
results indicated that Microsoft’s products did not have a large enough
market share to be considered competitors with major players in the
industry, Android and iOS.24 The EC further argued that Nokia should
not even be included in the competition investigation based on how EU
merger control is designed.25 The US and EU both moved quickly in
microsoft-antitrust/u-s-approves-microsoft-purchase-of-nokias-mobilebusiness-idUSBRE9B10TY20131202 [hereinafter U.S. Approves]; EU
Commission Approves Microsoft Takeover of Nokia Business; REUTERS
(Dec. 4, 2013, 8:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eucommission-microsoft-nokia/eu-commission-approves-microsoft-takeoverof-nokia-business-idUSBRE9B30SP20131204 [hereinafter EU
Commission].
21
The Hart–Scott–Rodino Act of 1976 amended the Clayton Antitrust Act to
include a premerger notification program, which requires corporations to
notify the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ in advance of any
mergers or acquisitions. See Premerger Notification Program, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (last visited June 18, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program. After
notification, such deals enter a waiting period during which the government
reviews them. If a certain M&A transaction poses a threat to the market and
consumers, the FTC and DOJ may interfere through formal legal action.
Otherwise deal closure is permitted after the waiting period (outlined in the
Hart–Scott–Rodino Act) terminates. In some cases, the government may find
a transaction to be harmless competition-wise and will thus grant early
termination of the waiting period, tantamount to early approval. See also
Merger Review, FED. TRADE COMM’N (last visited June 18, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/merger-review.
22
Granting of Request for Early Termination of the Waiting Period Under
the Premerger Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 76146–48 (Dec. 16, 2013).
23
See Case COMP/M.7047 - Microsoft/Nokia, 2013 O.J. (C. 8873) 1, 8–9
[hereinafter EC Decision].
24
The Commission concluded that after acquiring Nokia’s DSB, Microsoft’s
market share would still be too insignificant to represent a risk of
monopolization. This was true for all of Microsoft’s products and assets,
including its Windows Phone operating system, its Office program and other
productivity apps, and its patents regarding the data synchronization protocol
named Exchange ActiveSync (“EAS”). Id. paras. 102–03, 137–38, 164.
25
Id. paras. 252–63. The EC was hesitant to include Nokia in this case’s
competition investigation, stating that since the “merged entity” consisted of
only Microsoft and the acquired Nokia division, the remainder of Nokia fell
outside the Merger Regulation’s scope. The EC nevertheless reasoned as if
Nokia were subject to the investigation. The EC concluded that Nokia’s
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clearing the acquisition, declining to place any sort of conditions on
Microsoft and Nokia.26
By contrast, the authorities in China, South Korea, and Taiwan
were more circumspect in their decision-making. All three ultimately
opted to grant approval for the merger on a conditional basis between
early 2014 and mid-2015. 27 Most of the conditions imposed on
Microsoft involved its standard essential patents (“SEPs”) and
nonstandard essential patents (non-SEPs).28 Microsoft’s ability to seek
injunctive relief against domestic companies was restricted, thereby
blocking a crucial strategy in patent enforcement and litigation. 29
Limitations were also imposed on Microsoft’s freedom to charge future
licensees a higher royalty rate or impose other unfavorable license
terms. 30 For Nokia, while regulators in China, South Korea, and
Taiwan focused on its numerous telecommunication SEPs, they did not
uniformly impose conditions on Nokia.31

standard essential patents (“SEPs”) were already subject to fair, reasonable
and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) commitments made to standard setting
organizations (“SSOs”) and most of them were already in-license
agreements, which Nokia could not readily alter the fees and terms of.
Nokia’s non-SEPs, on the other hand, did not constitute a portfolio too
extensive to design around, and their enforcement efforts were not mergerspecific in the sense that, even before the merger, these patents were already
being used by Nokia to seek injunctions and to sue for infringement.
26
U.S. Approves, supra note 20; EU Commission, supra note 20.
27
See Jung Suk-yee, Korea Fair Trade Commission Gives Conditional
Approval to Business Consolidation of Microsoft and Nokia, BUSINESS
KOREA (Feb. 6, 2015, 00:28),
http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/politics/8925-ms-nokiamerger-approved-korea-fair-trade-commission-gives-conditional-approval.
28
Shangwu Bu (商务部) [China Ministry of Com.], Shangwu Bu Gonggao
2014 Nian Di 24 Hao (商务部公告 2014 年第 24 号) [China Ministry of
Com. Announcement No. 24 of 2014] 1, 8 (2014),
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/e/c/201404/20140400542508.shtml
(China) [hereinafter MOFCOM Decision]; The Korea Fair Trade
Commission (“KFTC”) Roots Out the Possibility of MS’s Abuse of Patent
Rights, Korea Fair Trade Commission 1, 3–5 (Aug. 24, 2015),
http://www.ftc.go.kr/solution/skin/doc.html?fn=47a731f026da112322e2a330
b7ffd350ff0c3dd0f93bb32e33d808d3bbeb66f1&rs=/fileupload/data/result/B
BSMSTR_000000002402/ [hereinafter KFTC Decision].
29
MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28 at 8; KFTC Decision, supra note 28 at
3, 5.
30
MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28 at 8; KFTC Decision, supra note 28 at
4.
31
MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28 at 9–10; KFTC Decision, supra note
28 at 5–6; Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (“TFTC”) Merger Case Decision
No. 103001 at 1–2 (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/uploadDecision/771dabc1-ec6b-4d37-acf7cf94f057427b.pdf (in Chinese) [hereinafter TFTC Decision].
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It is evident that a major difference between authorities in Eastern
and Western nations lies in how they addressed the M&A participants’
patents. The East Asian countries were all particularly focused on
patents and especially how they would be enforced after the
acquisition.32 The Western jurisdictions, most notably the EU in its
detailed decision, elected to downplay the merger’s impact on the
patent license market.33 The scale and significance of the mobile device
industry in various countries may have been a major factor influencing
their respective decisions. For East Asian countries, smartphone
companies represent larger shares of national economies than they do
in the US or EU; thus, East Asian countries had more at stake in
Microsoft’s venture into the smartphone market. 34 It is therefore
natural that the East Asian authorities would scrutinize Microsoft and
Nokia’s deal more closely than their EU and US counterparts and
enforce their antitrust law in a manner that would protect a substantial
portion of their domestic industry. Despite this common focus on their
domestic economies, the various East Asian countries’ regulators
reached different decisions because of historical and focal differences
in competition regulations as well as their specific partitions of the
general “mobile device industry”.35
An “international competition law” has never been promulgated
under the current World Trade Organization (“WTO”) regime. 36
Without a binding global standard, each national government has the
sovereign authority to protect its domestic market and tailor regulations
to fit the local economy and industry policy.37 Through analysis of the
Microsoft–Nokia merger case, this article attempts to illuminate how
antitrust merger control regulations can be used to protect the
development of local industry and still allow both investment in and
access to the domestic market by MNCs. The argument herein is that
when interfering with market function and scrutinizing M&A deals,
32
See MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28 at 9–10; KFTC Decision, supra
note 28 at 5–6.
33
See EC Decision, supra note 23, at 17–18.
34
See Richard Wray, How the Smartphone Made Europe Look Stupid, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2010, 19:06),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/feb/14/mobile-world-congressphones-networks.
35
See Microsoft & Nokia v. Fair Trade Commission, 2015 SIFAYUAN
JIANSUO XITONG 31–32 (Taipei High Admin. Ct. Jun. 25, 2015) [hereinafter
THAC Adjudication].
36
See Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises
at the Expense of Multinational Companies in China and Other Countries,
41 N.C. J. INT'L L. 455, 456 (2016).
37
See Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 355, 355 (2004).
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government antitrust agencies should broadly consider the balance of
the domestic industry’s development, the benefit to local consumers,
and the harm to foreign MNCs.38 Closely examining the Microsoft–
Nokia merger control case can help to clarify differences in national
economies and domestic industries among these jurisdictions and
policy motivations for the antitrust agencies’ merger control decisions.
This article sequentially discusses the Microsoft–Nokia merger
control decisions in China, South Korea, and Taiwan. Each discussion
begins with a brief introduction to the competition law and its
enforcement within each jurisdiction. The discussion then focuses on
how each national antitrust agency determined the conditions to attach
to the approval of the acquisition application. Finally, and of the most
importance, the scope and intensity of restrictions imposed by each
authority are compared as well as policy motivations for such
restrictions. The final section is the conclusion.
I.

MICROSOFT-NOKIA MERGER CONTROL DECISIONS
A. Decision in China

China enacted its Antimonopoly Law (“AML”) in 2008.39 At the
time of Microsoft and Nokia’s proposed M&A, China had three
government agencies responsible for AML enforcement: the National
Development and Research Commission (“NDRC”), which addresses
price-related monopolistic conduct, the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”), which enforces AML rules not
related to price, and the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”), which
oversees merger control.40 The following analysis is not affected by the
fact that China subsequently consolidated its antitrust enforcement
agencies into the State Administration for Market Regulation

38

See Sergio Baches Opi, Merger Control in the United States and European
Union: How Should the United States' Experience Influence the Enforcement
of the Council Merger Regulation?, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 223, 225–
33 (1997).
39
Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, China's Competition Policy
Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 238
(2008). Generally, the AML prohibits monopolistic conduct, including
entering into anticompetitive agreements, abusing dominant market position,
and engaging in M&As that may potentially eliminate or restrict
competition. See also Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust
Functionalism: Reconsidering China's Antimonopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT'L L.
379, 396 (2009).
40
Jillian Bray, Firmly Grasping the Knife: An Investigation of the
Asymmetric Application of Chinese Antitrust Law as a Protectionist Tool, 24
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 351, 366 (2016).
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(“SAMR”), but it is relevant that the MOFCOM was the authority in
charge of the case this articles focuses on.41
The purpose of China’s AML, to some extent, differs from that of
other countries’ competition laws. The general consensus is that the
basic goals of antitrust law are to enhance economic efficiency and to
safeguard consumer welfare. 42 As a part of antitrust enforcement,
merger control should only aim to protect consumers by prohibiting
M&As that are likely to create or enhance market power rather than
reaching to serve broader policy goals such as public interest or
industry development.43 By contrast, China’s AML states clearly that
its purpose is to “promot[e] the healthy development of socialist market
economy”.44 The term “socialist market economy” refers to China’s
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and is an indication of the country’s
public ownership.45 Thus, it is evident that in addition to promoting
market-based competition, China drafted its AML to at least in part
facilitate the pursuit of goals established by the Chinese Communist
Party (“CCP”), one of which is bolstering its SOEs.46 The MOFCOM
is instructed to consider the resulting influence on national economic
development when evaluating proposed M&As.47
M&A deals cannot be closed without approval by the MOFCOM
if the deal participants exceed the turnover threshold set separately by
the Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior Notification

41

Miguel del Pino et al., International Antitrust, 53 YEAR IN REV. (ABA) 33,
42 (2019).
42
Andrew L. Foster, Navigating the Unique Features of China’s
Competition Landscape, 31 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 80 (2017) (“Notwithstanding
ongoing debate as to whether consumer welfare or total welfare should form
the benchmark for the relevant economic welfare standard, most competition
regulators accept that the basic goals of antitrust law are to enhance
economic efficiency and safeguard consumer welfare.”).
43
Id.
44
Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 1
(promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
on Aug. 30, 2007 and effective Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter AML], available
at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/2013
03/20130300045909.shtml.
45
Daniel C.K. Chow, China's Enforcement of its Anti-Monopoly Law and
Risks to Multinational Companies, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 99, 102–03
(2016).
46
Id.; See also Joanna Tsai & Yajing Jiang, Lessons from an Analysis of the
Economic Approaches in China and the United States in Recent and Earlier
Cross-Jurisdictional Merger Cases, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1117, 1123–24
(2017).
47
AML, supra note 44, art. 27(5).
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of Concentrations of Undertakings. 48 These M&A participants are
responsible for submitting a notification to the MOFCOM, which
triggers a 30-day “Phase 1” initial merger review period after which it
decides whether the notification is complete.49 The MOFCOM may
extend the review period by 90 days (known as a “Phase 2” review),
which may be extended by an additional 60 days if the participants
agree. 50 After review and investigation, the MOFCOM may either
approve without conditions, impose certain restrictions, or block the
transaction completely. 51 Although the MOFCOM has rarely
intervened in M&A deals, these cases are especially important because
they provide insight into when and how the MOFCOM steps in. 52
When the MOFCOM does opt to conditionally approve an M&A deal,
behavioral conditions are imposed more frequently than structural
ones.53
In the Microsoft–Nokia acquisition case, Microsoft and Nokia
filed a notification with the MOFCOM on 13 September 2013.54 The
MOFCOM accepted the notification as complete and initiated a Phase
1 review on 10 October 2013.55 The investigation extended into Phase
2 on 8 November 2013 and was further extended for another 60 days
on 8 February 2014. 56 The acquisition application was eventually
approved by the MOFCOM on 8 April 2014.57 Because of the deal’s
potential effect on the patent license market, the MOFCOM concluded
that it had concerns regarding the potential anticompetitive effect of

48
Id. arts. 21, 25, 26; Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior
Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings (promulgated by the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China on Aug. 1, 2008 and effective
Aug. 1, 2008), available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/c/200903/20090306071501.shtml.
49
AML, supra note 44, art. 25.
50
Id. art. 26.
51
Id. arts. 28–29.
52
See Cunzhen Huang & Fei Deng, Convergence with Chinese
Characteristics? A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparative Study of Recent
Merger Enforcement in China, ANTITRUST 44, 44 (2017). See also Fei Deng
& Cunzhen Huang, A Ten-Year Review of Merger Enforcement in China,
THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, 1, 1 (2018).
53
Shaoping Chen, Merger Control Under China's Anti-Monopoly Law, 13
CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 177, 199 (2013).
54
MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28, at 1.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
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Microsoft’s Android license program (including both SEPs and nonSEPs) and Nokia’s telecommunication SEPs.58
The MOFCOM was first concerned that Microsoft would
transform into a smartphone original equipment manufacturer
(“OEM”) after the acquisition and thus would directly compete with
Chinese domestic manufacturers, the vast majority of which produced
Android phones.59 Microsoft would then have both the motivation and
the power to raise royalty fees for its Android license program,
containing key Android-related patents that would be virtually
impossible for the Chinese domestic manufacturers to circumvent.60
The acquisition would enable Microsoft to impose extra costs on its
opponents or even provide it with the leverage necessary to require
manufacturers to transform into production of devices using the
Windows Phone operating system.61 For Nokia, the company would
leave the smartphone manufacturing market and primarily retain its
SEP licensing business.62 This suggested that Nokia would be inclined
to raise its SEP royalty fees in search of profit and could do so without
consequences because it would no longer need to obtain cross-licenses
from its licensees.63
The MOFCOM therefore decided to impose certain restrictions on
both Microsoft and Nokia to preserve competition in the Chinese
domestic patent license market. 64 The list of restrictions in the

58
Id. at 5–6. The relevant markets in the case were the following: (1)
smartphone (not including tablet), (2) mobile device operating system, and
(3) mobile device patent license. The MOFCOM, in the merger control
decision, did not think Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia would disrupt the
smartphone and operating system markets, given the miniscule market shares
of Microsoft’s mobile device operating system and Nokia’s smartphone. Id.
at 2–4.
59
See Dominic Sunnebo, Android 87% Share in China; More Brands
Competing, KANTAR WORLDPANEL (May 10, 2017), 1, 1–2,
https://www.kantarworldpanel.com/global/News/Android-87-Share-inChina-More-Brands-Competing.
60
MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28, at 4–5.
61
Id.
62
See Dan Levine, Why Nokia Didn't Sell Its Patents to Microsoft, REUTERS
(Sep. 4, 2013, 12:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nokiamicrosoft-patents/why-nokia-didnt-sell-its-patents-to-microsoftidUSBRE9820ZZ20130903.
63
See MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28, at 5–7.
64
See Elizabeth Xiao-Ru Wang, Patent Pledge Enforcement in China, in
PATENT PLEDGES: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW’S PRIVATE
ORDERING FRONTIER 197, 202–03 (Jorge L. Contreras & Meredith Jacob
eds., 2017).

2020]

MICROSOFT-NOKIA MERGER

461

MOFCOM’s decision turned out to be extensive and onerous.65 With
respect to Microsoft’s SEPs, Microsoft was required to (1) continue to
adhere to the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”)
commitments it had made to standard setting organizations (“SSOs”),
(2) not seek injunctive relief or exclusion orders against Chinese
smartphone manufacturers, (3) not request that licensees license their
patents to Microsoft in exchange (except for the licensees’ SEPs in the
same standard), and (4) not transfer its SEPs to a party who refused to
follow all of the above.66 As for Microsoft’s non-SEPs, the restrictions
were also demanding. Microsoft had to (1) continue to offer
nonexclusive licenses to Chinese smartphone manufacturers, (2) cap
future royalty rates and license terms unrelated to price at the thencurrent level, and (3) not transfer any of the non-SEPs to any other
party until 5 years after the acquisition deal. 67 With respect to
restrictions relating to its SEPs, Nokia also had to (1) continue to honor
its FRAND commitments to SSOs, (2) not seek injunctive relief against
good-faith potential licensees, (3) agree to use independent arbitration
to solve FRAND disputes and be bound by the arbitrator’s decision, (4)
not bundle or tie SEPs with other non-FRAND-committed patents to
license, and (5) agree to never transfer its SEPs to a party refusing to
honor FRAND commitments.68
Overall, the restrictions imposed by the MOFCOM covered
activities in both SEP and non-SEP license markets.69 Compared with
unconditional approvals given by the US and EU, these restrictions
seem onerous. This accords with the tendency of Chinese antitrust
enforcement agencies to impose stricter conditions than their US and
EU counterparts, especially where patent rights are concerned.70 The
Chinese government increasingly uses antitrust law to address

65
Although it appeared that the MOFCOM decided these terms unilaterally,
a document published by Microsoft on its official blog indicates that the
MOFCOM’s decision came as a result of some sort of negotiation with
Microsoft and Nokia, albeit not through an “official” consent decree process.
See Chinese Ministry of Commerce Approves Microsoft-Nokia Deal,
MICROSOFT CORPORATE BLOGS (Apr. 8, 2014),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2014/04/08/chinese-ministry-of-commerceapproves-microsoft-nokia-deal/.
66
MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28, at 7.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 8.
69
Huang & Deng, supra note 52, at 47.
70
Id. at 45.
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perceived “monopolistic” practices in industries, particularly in the
technology industry where SEPs are a major issue.71
B. Decision in South Korea
South Korea introduced its Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade
Act (“MRFTA”) in 1980 and established the Korea Fair Trade
Commission (“KFTC”) as its enforcing agency.72 Not unlike China’s
AML, the MRFTA strives for “the balanced development of the
national economy.” 73 It is apparent that promoting national policy
plays a role in enforcement of MRFTA, although in traditional areas of
antitrust enforcement, including merger control, it may not be as much
of a priority as it is in China.74 MRFTA was voluntarily introduced
without influence from other countries or organizations and with an
aim to respond to public demand to counter the tyranny of chaebols
and establish a well-functioning market economy in a time of political
and economic turmoil.75 Enforcing MRFTA enables the KFTC to limit
the dominance of chaebols and protect parties at a disadvantage such
as consumers or small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”).76 The
chaebols are mega corporate groups that are often established and
owned by a single person or family.77 In the 1950s, the South Korean
government decided that allowing a few select companies to freely
expand into various industries was a shortcut to increasing exports and
jobs.78 The government went so far as to explicitly provide the newborn

71

Liyang Hou & Mengchi Tian, IPR Protection and Antitrust Regulation of
SEPs in China, in SEPS, SSOS AND FRAND: ASIAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES ON FOSTERING INNOVATION IN INTERCONNECTIVITY 232,
253–54 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2020).
72
See Hwang Lee, Overview of Competition Policy, in CHINA-KOREA IP &
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL REPORT 2017 VOLUME I 163, 164, 173 (Meng
Yanbei & Lee Hwang eds., 2017).
73
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (effective Dec. 31, 1980, as
amended on Dec. 30, 1996). The purpose of the MRFTA also includes
promoting fair and free competition, encouraging creative enterprising
activities, and protecting consumers. Id.
74
See Youngjin Jung & Seung Wha Chang, Korea's Competition Law and
Policies in Perspective, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 687, 695 (2006).
75
Lee, supra note 72, at 164. See also Kyu Uck Lee, Economic Development
and Competition Policy in Korea, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 67, 70
(2002).
76
Lee, supra note 72, at 173.
77
See Jeong Seo, Who Will Control Frankenstein? The Korean Chaebol's
Corporate Governance, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 21, 23 (2006).
78
Jingyuan Ma & Mel Marquis, Business Culture in East Asia and
Implications for Competition Law, 51 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 13 (2016).
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chaebols with benefits, such as cheap loans and relief funds. 79
Chaebols that have dominated South Korea to this day include worldclass mobile device manufacturers Samsung and LG, which, as is
explained later, may be of certain importance in the Microsoft–Nokia
merger control decision.
In the Microsoft–Nokia case, Microsoft and Nokia notified the
KFTC of their M&A transaction on 1 November 2013. 80 After the
KFTC expressed concerns, Microsoft voluntarily proposed a remedy
program on 27 August 2014, but it was deemed to be insufficient.81 The
KFTC initiated a consent decree process on 4 February 2015, and the
acquisition application was eventually approved on 24 August 2015,
with Microsoft agreeing to an alternate remedy plan.82
In the KFTC’s competition analysis, the sole relevant market was
the patent license market comprising both smartphone and tablet
patents.83 The KFTC’s main concern was that Microsoft “might abuse
its patent rights against Korean smartphone manufacturers” upon
becoming a device manufacturer itself through the acquisition.84 Stated
differently, the risk was that while engaging in the device business,
Microsoft might unilaterally raise license royalties or file patent
lawsuits against its competitors to obstruct their businesses.85
In fact, the restrictions the KFTC imposed on Microsoft were
quite comparable to the MOFCOM’s aforementioned conditions,
where both Microsoft’s SEPs and non-SEPs were addressed.
79

See Christopher Hale, Addressing the Incentive for Expropriation Within
Business Groups: The Case of the Korean Chaebol, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1, 27 (2006).
80
KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 1.
81
Id. at 1–2.
82
Id. at 1–7.
83
Id. at 2. The KFTC also stated in its public notice that the geographic
scope of its remedy plan included not only South Korea but also overseas
markets because the plan sought to impose a limit on Microsoft’s ability to
exercise patent rights in foreign jurisdictions. Id. In the same case, the
MOFCOM had limited the scope merely to the Chinese domestic market.
MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28, at 4.
84
KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 1.
85
Id. However, the KFTC’s concern was not without criticism. Post-merger
Microsoft might have little ability to raise its license royalties because major
Android device manufacturers were said to have long-term license contracts
with Microsoft; moreover, in reality Microsoft had weak incentives to raise
its royalties because of the low popularity of Nokia’s smartphone (Lumia)—
Microsoft would minimally benefit from raising royalties demanded of
Android device manufacturers. Sang-Seung Yi & Yoonhee Kim, Patent
Pledges: Korean Perspectives, in PATENT PLEDGES: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
ON PATENT LAW’S PRIVATE ORDERING FRONTIER 209, 221 (Jorge L.
Contreras & Meredith Jacob eds., 2017).
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Microsoft’s SEPs were those related to communication technology,
and its non-SEPs were those that consisted of core Android
technologies, which the KFTC claimed were “practically impossible to
replace or circumvent”.86 Regarding its SEPs, Microsoft agreed to (1)
continue to honor its FRAND license commitments to SSOs, (2) not
seek any SEP-based injunctive relief or exclusion orders against South
Korean smartphone or tablet manufacturers, (3) not require SEP
licensees to grant back their patents to Microsoft (except for the
licensees’ SEPs essential to the identical standard), and (4) not transfer
its SEPs to any party that did not agree to follow all of the above.87 As
for its non-SEPs, Microsoft agreed to (1) continue to offer
nonexclusive licenses to South Korean smartphone or tablet
manufacturers, (2) keep royalty rates and non-pricing license terms no
more demanding than before the acquisition, (3) offer a complete
license package to South Korean manufacturers who were previously
only partially covered, (4) not transfer these non-SEPs for 5 years, and
(5) not seek non-SEP-based injunctive relief or exclusion orders
against South Korean manufacturers whose license negotiations are in
good faith.88 After conducting its investigation into what would remain
of Nokia after the acquisition, the KFTC concluded that Nokia’s
patents were “not merger-specific [and thus not] subject to the M&A
investigation.”89 Ultimately, no obligation was imposed on Nokia by
the KFTC, which was a quite different outcome from the severe
restrictions imposed on Nokia’s patent license in China.90
C. Decision in Taiwan
Taiwan enacted its Fair Trade Act (“FTA”) in 1992, and it was a
major and necessary step toward conformance with international trade
practices.91 The Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (“TFTC”) was vested
with power to enforce the FTA through various means, including
competition investigations, imposition of sanctions, and, of course,

86

KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 3–4. Note that most of these patents
were not South Korean patents. Jurata & Owens, supra note 3, at 1141.
87
KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 3.
88
Id. at 4–5.
89
Id. at 6.
90
The KFTC mentioned at the end that it conducted a separate investigation
into Nokia and would continue monitoring Nokia’s potential abuse of
patents. Id.
91
Pijan Wu & Caroline Thomas, Taiwan's Fair Trade Act: Achieving the
‘Right’ Balance?, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 643, 645 (2006).
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merger control.92 The FTA was not a purely domestic development but
was strongly influenced by relevant statutes in the US, EU, and Japan.93
The introduction of the FTA in Taiwan was not voluntary, and during
the legislative process, numerous concerns were raised in the society.
It took over 10 years to draft and finally implement the FTA.94 The
most disputed aspects of the FTA were provisions and policies for
stricter merger control, which possibly were in conflict with the
government’s own policy of encouraging mergers; concerns were
raised about delaying and hindering future M&As.95 To avoid delay
and also alleviate administrative burdens, the TFTC amended its
provisions in 2002 to adopt a “pre-merger notification system”; before
the 2002 amendment, companies had to obtain its prior approval.96 In
the current system, companies are required to notify the TFTC if a
prospective M&A participant exceeds the market share or sales figure
threshold.97 Within a certain period outlined in the FTA, the TFTC can
opt to make a decision to either completely block or conditionally
approve an M&A deal; otherwise, the companies can proceed with the
deal.98 Conditional approval means the TFTC can attach conditions,
including performing certain undertakings, to its approval decisions
provided that the agency has anticompetitive concerns regarding a
deal.99 These decisions, conditions, and undertakings can be appealed
to administrative courts in Taiwan.100
1. TFTC Decision
In the Microsoft–Nokia case, Microsoft and Nokia filed a merger
notification with the TFTC on November 20, 2013. 101 The TFTC
issued its decision on February 19, 2014, which was earlier than the

92
Fair Trade Act of 2017, arts. 6, 10–12, 26–28 (promulgated Feb. 4, 1991,
amended Jun. 14, 2017), XIANXING FAGUI HUIBIAN, available at
http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=1295&docid
=15182. [hereinafter referred to as the Taiwan Fair Trade Act].
93
Wu & Thomas, supra note 91, at 664.
94
See id. at 646.
95
Id. at 646, 655.
96
See id. at 656.
97
Taiwan Fair Trade Act, supra note 92, art. 11.
98
Id.
99
Wu & Thomas, supra note 91, at 650; Taiwan Fair Trade Act, supra note
92, art. 13. When deciding whether to completely block the transaction or to
impose conditions or undertakings, the TFTC evaluates whether the overall
economic benefit of the merger would outweigh the disadvantages that
would result from competition restraint.
100
Taiwan Fair Trade Act, supra note 92, art. 48.
101
THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 2.
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decisions of authorities in either China or South Korea.102 The TFTC’s
restrictions on Microsoft’s and Nokia’s patent license practices were
more moderate than those imposed on Microsoft by China or South
Korea or those imposed on Nokia by China.103 The main concern of the
TFTC was fairly similar to those of the MOFCOM and KFTC, namely
that it would be possible for Microsoft to raise the license fees for its
Android license program not for the relatively benign purpose of
pushing mobile device manufacturers to select the less costly Windows
Phone operating system but rather for the anticompetitive purpose of
harming its new opponents in device manufacturing. 104 The TFTC
contended that after acquiring Nokia’s DSB, Microsoft could possibly
manufacture its own devices rather than rely on other manufacturers to
do so. 105 Microsoft therefore might have an incentive to raise the
Android licenses fees to raise rivals’ manufacturing cost.106 For Nokia,
upon selling its DSB, the company would have the capability to
increase its SEP license fees because it would no longer need to acquire
cross-licenses from its licensees.107 Most notably, the TFTC indicated
that the FTA had not excluded Nokia from its competition
investigation, even though it had sold only some of its assets.108 The
TFTC stated clearly in its decision that the agency opted to take a
different stance from that of the EC regarding the inclusion of Nokia in
the investigation.109
The TFTC’s list of restrictions on Microsoft and Nokia was a very
short one compared with that of the MOFCOM or the KFTC. The
102

See TFTC Decision, supra note 31, at 10.
See id. at 1–2. In the TFTC’s decision, the relevant markets were found to
include mobile operating systems, mobile devices (both smartphones and
tablets) and patent licensing for both, but the TFTC’s investigation and
decision focused on the patent license market, which is the same with the
MOFCOM’s and KFTC’s investigations. As for the geographic market, the
TFTC limited the scope of its investigation to effects on the domestic
market, which is the same as MOFCOM’s scope but different from that of
the KFTC’s. See id. at 1–3.
104
See id. at 5–7. The TFTC reasoned that because the Android and iOS
ecosystems were both far more developed than the Windows Phone
ecosystem, they were popular enough among consumers to ensure that
manufacturers had little incentive to switch to Windows Phone, even if
Microsoft demanded higher Android fees. Another group of Microsoft’s
patents, those related to EAS technology, were not as readily exploitable
because they were mostly already subject to long-term license agreements
with fees that could not be altered unilaterally by Microsoft. See id.
105
Id. at 6.
106
TFTC Decision, supra note 31, at 6.
107
Id. at 7.
108
Id. at 7–8.
109
Id.
103
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TFTC simply ordered (1) Microsoft to not inappropriately price or
discriminate when licensing its mobile device related patents to allow
licensees to freely choose which operating system to incorporate into
their devices, and (2) Nokia to continue licensing its SEPs according to
FRAND principles and to not transfer SEPs to any party that did not
agree to do so as well.110
Despite fewer and less severe restrictions being imposed, the
Microsoft–Nokia case was not yet over in Taiwan. The parties filed a
petition appealing the TFTC’s restrictions at the Taipei High
Administrative Court (“THAC”), which they would not do with respect
to the later China and South Korea decisions. 111 After the TFTC’s
decision was upheld by the THAC, Nokia opted to appeal even further
to the Supreme Administrative Court (“SAC”). The appeal was denied
on August 3, 2016, and finally the case was resolved.112 Although the
petition was unsuccessful, the THAC’s and SAC’s adjudication
incorporated debates between the TFTC and Microsoft/Nokia and
resulted in a more thorough exposition of the legal reasoning of the
TFTC’s decision.
2. THAC Adjudication
Before the THAC, the merger-seeking parties argued that the
TFTC failed to articulate why having a stronger ability to raise license
fees would necessarily lead them to actually doing so and had relied on
adverse testimony from fellow competitors and their own
speculations.113 However, the THAC sided with the TFTC, finding that
its collected evidence had been sufficiently examined without bias.114
The THAC further indicated that because of the dynamic and uncertain
nature of competition in the high-tech market, the TFTC may rely on
evidence that is relatively lacking in clarity or specificity to justify its
decision.115
The parties also argued that the TFTC should have considered
prior decisions in many other jurisdictions rather than only the later
110

Id. at 2.
See THAC Adjudication, supra note 35.
112
Nokia v. Fair Trade Commission, 2016 SIFAYUAN JIANSUO XITONG (Sup.
Admin. Ct. Aug. 3, 2016) [hereinafter SAC Adjudication].
113
See THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 6, 8–9.
114
See id. at 34–41; Andy C. M. Chen, Patent Assertion Entities in Merger
Review in Taiwan: Issues of Characterization and Remedies, PATENT
ASSERTION ENTITIES AND COMPETITION POLICY 1, 4–5 (2017).
115
Chen, supra note 114, at 4. However, the THAC’s adjudication and
rationale were criticized for ambiguously refuting the argument that merger
control was a process of “predicting” future market impacts. Id.
111
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decisions in China and South Korea116—before the TFTC decision, the
Microsoft–Nokia case had already been approved unconditionally in
the US, EU, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine.117
However, the THAC in its adjudication elected to only refer to the later
MOFCOM and KFTC decisions in China and South Korea, agencies
which made the decisions after the TFTC and were the exceptions in
imposing restrictions on either Microsoft or Nokia. 118 The THAC
reasoned that Taiwan, China, and South Korea were home to mobile
device manufacturers, which was not the case for the US, EU, and
others, and consequently the antitrust authorities would likely make
different merger control decisions. 119 Because the portion of the
economy represented by mobile device manufacturing is substantially
larger in East Asian countries than in Western or other countries, the
effects of the Microsoft–Nokia acquisition in East Asia would
presumably be larger.120 Therefore, the various East Asian countries’
antitrust authorities were more cautious and approved the acquisition
only with certain restrictions imposed on the parties.121
The THAC further noted that Taiwan’s mobile device
manufacturers operated on the slimmest of profit margins and the
competition among these manufacturers was intense.122 If the TFTC
did not impose restrictions on merging entities in its approval, its
divergence from the actions of the MOFCOM and KFTC might lead
patentees to take advantage of the situation to raise their license fees in
Taiwan to compensate for their losses in other East Asian areas.123 This
would result in additional manufacturing costs and reduce the
manufacturers’ profit, which would be harmful to Taiwan’s domestic
manufacturers and reduce their competitiveness in the global market,
particularly with respect to rivals from China and South Korea.124 This
rationale not only justified the THAC’s adjudication referring to the
MOFCOM and KFTC decisions but also rebutted Nokia’s argument
that the TFTC should follow the EU’s example and not impose any
restrictions on it.

116

See THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 7, 9, 26–27, 32.
Id. at 26.
118
Id. at 26–27.
119
Id. at 26.
120
Id. at 26–32.
121
See id.
122
See THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 12, 31.
123
See id. at 12.
124
See id. at 12, 31.
117
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3. SAC Adjudication
Nokia was the only party to appeal to the SAC. Despite Nokia
bringing up the EU and South Korean decisions as examples in its
argument that it should be excluded from the competition investigation,
the SAC held the same viewpoint as the THAC, which was to respect
the TFTC’s full authority to make its own decisions according to
Taiwan’s own competition law and environment.125 If examples were
to be closely followed, then MOFCOM’s decision (where restrictions
on Nokia were even more strict than those in Taiwan) had to be taken
into consideration as well. 126 Nokia further argued that it was not
necessary to order FRAND compliance because it had already made
such commitments to SSOs. 127 The SAC rejected this argument,
opining that FRAND commitments were not designed for M&A
situations and did not contain provisions that prevent antitrust
authorities from imposing restrictions.128
The SAC also agreed with the THAC and TFTC that after selling
its DSB, Nokia would no longer manufacture and sell mobile devices
and its new business model would be built around licensing out
patents. 129 Prior to the acquisition, Nokia and Taiwanese domestic
manufacturers could “check-and-balance” each other because of their
respective licensing and manufacturing needs.130 If Nokia were to raise
license fees or change its license policy, Taiwanese manufacturers
could retaliate likewise. 131 However, once Nokia no longer
manufactures and sells mobile devices, the situation changes
dramatically. Nokia could possibly become a so-called non-practicing
entity (“NPE”), which profits by means of licensing patents.132 It would
then practically be impossible for the Taiwanese manufacturers to
“check-and-balance” Nokia given its market power based on its

125

See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112, at 22, 25, 32–34. The SAC further
stated that the decisions in the other jurisdictions did not have binding effect
for the court and that these foreign decisions at most served to ‘support’ the
court’s judgment. See id. at 34, 37.
126
See id. at 34, 37.
127
See id. at 26. This argument by Nokia was quite similar to the rationale of
the EU decision in the same case. See EC Decision, supra note 23, paras.
251–258.
128
See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112, at 38-39.
129
See id. at 40; THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 11, 35.
130
See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112; THAC Adjudication, supra note
35.
131
See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112; THAC Adjudication, supra note
35.
132
See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112.
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SEPs.133 The SAC ruled that the TFTC was justified in imposing the
FRAND requirements on Nokia’s SEPs as a result.
The SAC also discussed modern-era merger control, especially
where the transaction involves patents. The SAC stated that intangible
assets are undeniably of critical importance in merger control
decisions. 134 Thus, antitrust authorities should examine the merging
parties’ patents, informational assets, and their effect on the domestic
market. Even if a party (Nokia in this case) does not gain possession of
any new patents, if its existing patents could be used in the market in a
different manner, competition analysis is necessary. 135 The SAC
further opined that competition analysis is based on prediction 136 —
epistemologically, how an M&A transaction will affect the market
cannot be known beforehand. 137 But, provided that authorities base
their decisions on thorough research and convincing evidence, then
such decisions should not be deemed arbitrary.138
II.

DECISION COMPARISON

The Comparison of Microsoft–Nokia Merger Control Decisions
table summarizes in sequence the Microsoft–Nokia merger control
decisions as well as the final restrictions imposed on Microsoft’s and
Nokia’s patents.

133
See id. But it was commented that various rules or standards for
characterizing NPE were necessary, if the court or agency examined the
case’s competitive effect by means of the business-model transformation
theory. Chen, supra note 114, at 20.
134
See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112, at 32–33, 40.
135
See id. at 33.
136
Id. at 40–41.
137
See id. at 41.
138
See id.
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Issuing its decision in February 2014, the TFTC in Taiwan was
the first East Asian country to conditionally approve the case, followed
by the MOFCOM’s decision in China and KFTC’s consent agreement
in South Korea. 139 Of these, only the TFTC’s decision was later
appealed to the administrative courts (the THAC and SAC) and subject
to debate for over 2 years.140 During litigation in Taiwan, decisions by
the China and South Korea agencies were cited by parties and taken
under consideration by the courts.141 The TFTC’s conditional approval
was not only the first one issued and only one appealed in East Asia
but was also the last one affirmed in the world. 142 Because neither
Microsoft nor Nokia appealed in China, the MOFCOM’s conditional
approval was the first to be affirmed in East Asia.143 South Korea was
139

See MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28; see KFTC Decision, supra note
28; see TFTC Decision, supra note 31.
140
See MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28; see KFTC Decision, supra note
28; see TFTC Decision, supra note 31.
141
See, e.g., THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 32–33; SAC
Adjudication, supra note 112, at 34.
142
See Suk-yee, supra note 27.
143
See Luke Hung-yu Chuang (莊弘鈺), Shiye Jiehe Guanzhi zhi
Zhuanliquan Kaoliang Zuigao Xingzheng Fayuan 105 Niandu Panzi di 403
hao Panjue Pingxi (事業結合管制之專利權考量：最高行政法院 105 年
度判字第 403 號判決評析) [Patent Consideration in Merger Control:
Comment on Nokia v. FTC], TAIWAN L.J. (台灣法學雜誌), no. 380 (2019).
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the last of the three East Asian countries to make the merger control
decision.144 After the TFTC’s and MOFCOM’s decisions in early 2014,
the companies were probably aware that it was unlikely the KFTC
would approve the same case without any restrictions. Microsoft
therefore started to negotiate with and submitted its voluntary
corrective proposal to the KFTC in August 2014; the consent
agreement was reached in August 2015, which effectively resolved
potential disputes. 145 The restrictions on Microsoft’s patents were
similar in South Korea and China, indicating that the MOFCOM’s
decision might have been highly influential on the KFTC’s consent
agreement.
As for restrictions on patents, the MOFCOM imposed severe
restrictions on Microsoft’s and Nokia’s patents. Neither Microsoft nor
Nokia could freely exercise their patent rights in China; for instance,
they were limited in their abilities to file for injunctive relief, determine
license rates and terms, and select assignees. The TFTC imposed
relatively moderate restrictions on Microsoft’s and Nokia’s patents.
Microsoft and Nokia were still permitted to seek injunctive relief and
change license terms if the situation was appropriate, and Microsoft
had much freedom to transfer its patents because of no period or
assignee restraints. The KFTC’s restrictions were somewhere in the
middle. As the MOFCOM had, the KFTC imposed extensive
restrictions on Microsoft’s patents, particularly on Microsoft’s nonSEPs; however, unlike the MOFCOM and TFTC, the KFTC imposed
no restrictions on Nokia’s patents. Thus, Microsoft would have mostly
the same restraints on its patent enforcement in South Korea and China,
but Nokia would not be restrained in its patent enforcement in South
Korea, unlike in China and Taiwan.
III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Intensity of Antitrust-Patent Regulation

In the preceding sections, it was clear that regulatory
considerations and eventual remedies revolved around Microsoft’s and
Nokia’s patents. Whether it is appropriate to restrict patent rights
through antitrust law and where boundaries should be set if so have
144
See Jessica C. Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in
Protecting Their Well-Known Trademarks in China, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
(2006).
145
See KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 1–2; Jinyul Ju, SEPS, SSOS AND
FRAND: ASIAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON FOSTERING INNOVATION IN
INTERCONNECTIVITY 212, 227 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds.,
2020).
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long been controversial questions.146 Some scholars have argued that
antitrust law is necessary to prevent patent holdup, especially in the
realm of SEPs, and it also ensures the effectiveness of FRAND
commitments. 147 Others have taken the opposite approach and
contended using antitrust measures to counter patent holdup is “a
dangerous cure for an illusory disease”.148
In China’s case, the MOFCOM apparently viewed the possibility
of Microsoft and Nokia taking actions, such as seeking injunctive relief
or setting more demanding license fees and terms, as crossing the line
from “regular patent exercising” to anticompetitive behavior and thus
intervened through merger control. Likewise, authorities in both South
Korea and Taiwan demonstrated antitrust law in these jurisdictions can
be used to control how patent owners exercise their rights. The
principle reason, although contested in litigation in Taiwan, was that
these East Asian countries are home to many mobile device
manufacturers; therefore, the three antitrust authorities had to take their
domestic industry development into account. 149 If one of these
authorities was more passive in enforcing its country’s antitrust law
while the others were more active, that country would be at risk for
patent owners shifting the pressure to their domestic licensees,
claiming more license fees and compensating for their losses in the
other countries. 150 Stated differently, these East Asian countries
possess largely similar industry environments and to some extent
compete with each other; thus, having manufacturing or licensing costs
deviate too much from others could damage competitiveness and the
domestic industry. The three antitrust authorities seemed to adopt a
similar stance for this reason, all intervening in the Microsoft–Nokia
transaction and eventually conditionally approving the case.151
146
See, e.g., Michal S. Gal & Alan D. Miller, Patent Challenge Clauses: A
New Antitrust Offense?, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1477 (2017); Matthew G. Sipe,
Patents v. Antitrust: Preempting Conflict, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 415 (2016).
147
A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law can Make
FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L. J. 2110 (2018).
148
David J. Kappos, The Antitrust Assault on Intellectual Property, 31
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 665, 673 (2018).
149
See THAC Adjudication, supra note 35, at 26.
150
See id. at 12.
151
The decisions by the EU and US to not interfere with Microsoft and
Nokia’s transaction were case specific and do not necessarily imply that
antitrust law never serves to restrict patent rights. Note that unlike the East
Asian antitrust authorities, the EC imposed no restriction on either
Microsoft’s or Nokia’s patents. EC Decision, supra note 23, at 49. If this is
not a simple matter of oversight by the EC, one might infer that at least in
this case’s investigation, the EC prioritized competition in the markets for
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The willingness to enforce antitrust law was similar among the
East Asian countries, but the intensity of the enforcement action varied.
With regard to Microsoft in this case, for instance, China and South
Korea both required that Microsoft comply with numerous
requirements, but Taiwan was more restrained in its approach. 152
Notably, China and South Korea both explicitly ordered the
continuation of FRAND licensing, whereas Taiwan did not. This
suggests that Chinese and South Korean authorities may be more
inclined to view FRAND requirements as a powerful tool to check SEP
owners.153
The disparity in strictness also likely had to do with the fact that
the TFTC had fewer prior examples to reference because it was one of
the first to decide whether to approve the M&A with certain
restrictions. This disparity also reflected differences in the three
authorities’ determination to safeguard its respective country’s mobile
device industry. In China’s case, companies such as Huawei, Xiaomi,
and Oppo together held a growing share of the global smartphone
market. 154 It was therefore likely that protecting this industry was
among the CCP’s policy goals,155 and this had a strong influence on the
MOFCOM’s decisions. In South Korea, though its world-class
companies Samsung and LG are both chaebol, which the government
should be inclined to restrain, the mobile device industry represents a
physical products over the market for patent licensing. But not much can be
inferred from the brief decision of the US authority, meaning no effective
comparison can be made between these two Western jurisdictions.
152
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Decision, supra note 28, at 8-9; KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 4-5. The
TFTC only required Microsoft not to inappropriately price or discriminate
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note 31, at 2.
153
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Chinese antitrust law. Claire Guo, Intersection of Antitrust Laws with
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154
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Globally: Counterpoint, GADGETS360 (Aug. 2, 2017),
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major sector of the South Korean economy; thus, Microsoft could not
be allowed to freely enter the market and take a share.156 Samsung’s
concern that Microsoft might raise its 76 at-issue SEPs for the Android
system was given a relatively high amount of weight by the KFTC
despite minimal support being offered for this proposition.157 Taiwan
is a relatively small country with a complicated diplomatic status and
a developed mobile device industry.158 The TFTC is in a very different
position than its equivalents in the US, EU, and even East Asia. 159
Taiwan was not anticipated to possess enough bargaining clout among
the international community to enforce its antitrust law; therefore, the
TFTC realistically could not impose extensive restrictions in its
conditional approval compared with the MOFCOM and KFTC in
China and South Korea.
B. Approaches to Post-Acquisition Nokia
Nokia, which sold off part of its business and became smaller and
seemingly less powerful after the acquisition, was treated quite
differently by the jurisdictions. The Merger Regulation of the EU was
construed to exclude Nokia from the competition investigation, finding
that it was not part of the “merged entity” because it would in fact lose
a part of its business.160 Taiwan’s TFTC and administrative courts held
that Nokia’s change in market position, business strategy, and
bargaining power would be the direct result of the transaction and thus
were merger-specific, but the TFTC imposed only light restrictions on
Nokia. 161 China was more proactive in restraining post-acquisition
156
Zahra Ullah, How Samsung Dominates South Korea's Economy, CNN
TECH (Feb. 17, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/17/technology/samsung-south-korea-dailylife/index.html. See also Yi & Kim, supra note 85, at 221.
157
Ju, supra note 145, at 226–27.
158
See Wu & Thomas, supra note 91, at 661.
159
See id.
160
As the EC stated, “Nokia is the seller whereas the Commission's
investigation relates to the merged entity.” Press Release, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, Mergers: Commission Clears Acquisition of Nokia's Mobile
Device Business by Microsoft (Dec. 4, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-13-1210_en.htm. Note that despite this, the EC was careful to
provide further reasoning, stating that Nokia’s SEPs were already subject to
SSO FRAND conditions and the non-SEPs were already in force and thus
not merger specific. See EC Decision, supra note 23, paras. 252–63.
161
The restrictions only required Nokia to continue its FRAND
commitments and to transfer its SEPs to assignees with the same
commitment. In fact, Nokia was not required to do anything other than
continue its FRAND commitments. TFTC Decision, supra note 31, at 2. Yet,
some American cases even held that although the SEPs were transferred, the
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Nokia, judging from its list of restrictions imposed on the company,
which was not much shorter than its list of restrictions on Microsoft.162
The MOFCOM justified its unique treatment of Nokia by
reasoning that Nokia’s business model would shift to an SEP-licensing
orientation; thus, it could arbitrarily raise licensing fees in search of
profit. China and Taiwan might have had the same concern that Nokia
would transform into an NPE, a concern made even more evident
during litigation at the SAC in Taiwan.163 China and Taiwan were thus
the only two regimes in the world to impose restrictions on Nokia. As
mentioned before, Taiwan was presumably cognizant of its special
diplomatic status and relatively weak bargaining power in the
international community, which may likely have been a factor in their
treatment towards MNCs and their patents. If the MOFCOM had not
taken a similar stance and imposed even more severe restrictions in
China, the TFTC might have lost its support in the global business
world and then would have eventually withdrawn its decision or settled
the case in the courts in Taiwan.
The KFTC’s decision was the last one made among the three
antitrust authorities, which means the Microsoft–Nokia acquisition had
already been subject to considerable discussion and debate in South
Korea.164 The KFTC did not concur with the TFTC’s and MOFCOM’s
decisions to restrict Nokia and opined that Nokia’s patents were not so
“merger-specific” as to call for competition investigation.165 Despite
initiating a separate investigation into Nokia and continuing to monitor
Nokia’s potential patent abuse, the KFTC undertook no further
proceedings and imposed no restrictions on Nokia in the end.166 One
possible reason for this result was that the KFTC did not believe that
the acquisition would necessarily transform Nokia into an NPE.167 In
fact, Nokia did continue operating some business units and even
FRAND commitments were binding on new assignees. See, e.g., Core
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 899 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
The aforementioned TFTC’s two restrictions on Nokia thus appears to be
redundant.
162
See MOFCOM Decision, supra note 28.
163
See SAC Adjudication, supra note 112, at 40.
164
See KFTC Decision, supra note 28, at 2.
165
Id. at 6. KFTC’s interpretation seemed to contrast with the TFTC’s and
MOFCOM’s, where the merger-specific quality was not based on Nokia
itself but rather on the potential change to Nokia’s market position and
business environment.
166
See id.
167
It might require more empirical or convincing evidence to understand
Nokia’s transformation into an NPE. Even the agency prediction and court
judgment in Taiwan were somewhat questionable. See Chen, supra note 114,
at 4–5, 20.
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launched new products after the acquisition, and consequently
classifying Nokia as an NPE would not be entirely accurate.168 The
South Korean patent remedy system was not suitable for Nokia to use
to become an NPE; although the courts could still give protection to
patent owners through infringement damages and injunctive relief, the
scale and impact were well below those of the US and EU.169 Another
possible reason for imposing no restraint on Nokia was to ensure South
Korean domestic manufacturers, primarily Samsung and LG, did not
receive excessive protection. Because Samsung and LG are two of the
most dominant chaebol in South Korea, offering too much support to
chaebol would have not only been harmful to the government’s public
image but also detrimental to South Korea’s market competition, which
is one of the reasons why South Korea’s MRFTA was enacted in the
first place.170
C. Following Appeals and Lawsuits
In China, South Korea, and Taiwan, the Microsoft–Nokia
acquisition was cleared under certain conditions. Despite those
conditions being far less severe in Taiwan than in the other two
countries, the only appeals in any country were filed against the
decision of Taiwan’s antitrust authority. One of the reasons may have
been that at the time, the majority of the global antitrust authorities
approved the Microsoft–Nokia M&A without imposing any conditions
or restrictions, making the TFTC a notable exception and the first to
issue such a conditional approval. In this view, it was reasonable for
Microsoft and Nokia to appeal to administrative courts. The THAC
sided with the TFTC, and Nokia was the only party to appeal to the
SAC, possibly because Microsoft realized that the restrictions it faced
in Taiwan were much more moderate than those it faced in China and
South Korea. Additionally, Microsoft’s and Nokia’s appeals also
reflected the controversial and conflicting merger policy in Taiwan.
The TFTC’s merger control might sometimes be cumbersome and
cause delay, but the government is usually active in promoting mergers
168
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170
Soeun Lee, Opportunity for South Korea to Break up ‘Chaebol’ System,
THE WISCONSIN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW (Mar. 5, 2017),
https://thewire.wisc.edu/2017/03/05/opportunity-for-south-korea-to-breakup-chaebol-system/. It was possible that the KFTC decided that reining in
Microsoft’s patents would be sufficient to safeguard the South Korean
mobile device industry and economy but allowing Nokia to enforce its
patents freely would provide for some “check-and-balance” against the
already-almighty Samsung and LG.
169
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and amending regulations such as the Business M&A Law and the
Company Law to liberalize Taiwan’s industry.171 The petition to the
administrative courts might also have helped to clarify the
government’s ambiguous policy regarding merger control. Finally,
again due to its unique international status, Taiwan does not have a
strong position from which to enforce its antitrust law against MNCs;
therefore, Nokia’s or Microsoft’s petition might best be viewed as a rebargaining process between the TFTC and MNCs in court.
It is understandable why judicial relief was not sought in China.
Though China’s legal system appears to offer means of appeal or
seeking relief, effective recourse is de facto nonexistent if a party is
dissatisfied with the MOFCOM’s decision regarding an M&A deal.172
Corporations might fear retribution by the Chinese government, as the
government has the power to interfere with their investment projects
and otherwise make business difficult. 173 Virtually, all enforcement
authorities and channels of relief are also controlled by the same
entity—the CCP. 174 It is therefore questionable whether an
independent judiciary can be realized under the Chinese regime. 175
With courts and appellate systems having difficulty deviating from the
administrative decisions by the MOFCOM—decisions of the CCP
itself, relief attempts are likely to be in vain and may even backfire on
the petitioning party.
For South Korea, the KFTC’s decision was preceded by a consent
decree process, which implied that Microsoft, at least to some extent,
had negotiated with the KFTC about its remedy options, thus putting
Microsoft in a more difficult position to disagree with the final
decision. 176 In fact, the KFTC’s decision came even later than the
TFTC’s and the MOFCOM’s decisions in Taiwan and China
respectively. It is possible that upon seeing how the case developed in
jurisdictions with an industry environment similar to South Korea’s,
171
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Microsoft did not anticipate receiving a merger control approval
without any restrictions or conditions. Additionally, the THAC issued
its adjudication opinion 2 months before the KFTC’s decision, which
might also have caused Microsoft to not feel optimistic about its
chances of success in the South Korean courts. The last possible reason
for not seeking judicial relief in South Korea is that Microsoft’s
acquisition of Nokia gradually turned out to be a “monumental
mistake”, which was already apparent by the time the deal was finally
approved in South Korea. 177 This provided little incentive for
Microsoft to pursue full implementation of the deal.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of an international competition regulation or
standard, each national antitrust agency is free to make its own merger
control decisions on the basis of the needs of its local economy and
industry policy. It was illustrated in the article that while most countries
imposed no restraints when approving the Microsoft–Nokia acquisition
application, there were three exceptions. China’s MOFCOM imposed
severe restraints on both Microsoft and Nokia, demonstrating the
Chinese government’s aim to protect its booming local industry. The
KFTC imposed constraints comparable to those of the MOFCOM’s on
Microsoft but not on Nokia, implying that the South Korean
government was cautious to enforce its antitrust policy to preserve its
own industrial innovation and balance. Despite Taiwan having limited
bargaining power in the international community, its TFTC
nevertheless imposed mild restraints on Microsoft and Nokia in what
might be called a bold pioneering decision in East Asia—it was even
the only decision worldwide that was appealed to a country’s highest
court. This comparative study illustrated the different stances Western
and Eastern countries may have regarding whether or not to interfere
with market operations through competition regulation. Most notably,
Eastern countries have a different regulatory intensity and scope
driving their considerations to intervene in market competition.
Competition regulation is never done in isolation from other factors,
and each country’s competition decision is indeed tailored to its
respective economic and political concerns.
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